Far-Right Parties, the European Union and the Power of Identity

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I. Introduction

The European Union has been, from its inception, an exercise in liberalism and an application of normative theory. The EU’s official documents espouse the virtues of what ought to be and the idea of building a better society. The EU lists a prescribed set of common values: freedoms, equality, dignity, justice and solidarity.¹ These qualities are broadcast in multiple directions: downward, from the EU to its individual member states, and outward, from the EU as a bloc to the rest of the world.

As the EU has expanded its influence since the Treaty of Maastricht through new members, a monetary union and linked social and economic policies, a fascinating trend has emerged. Far-right nationalist parties in several EU states have gradually gained footholds among their respective electorates. In some cases, these parties are no longer even fringe elements, but rather legitimate stakeholders in local and national governments and even within the European Parliament itself.

This paper seeks to examine examples of such parties and trace their national ascensions, trying to determine how much of their success is due to friction between voters and the EU itself. By looking at individual parties and their electoral results on a case-by-case basis, we will see what specific role the EU plays. We will attempt to gauge how both the downward and outward broadcasts affect far-right voting behavior.

Far-right nationalist parties at their cores exploit the power of identity.² The mentality of homogeneity and the aggressive protection of one’s culture against a perceived outside threat are powerful psychological triggers, and it is not difficult to understand how parties with those messages might be able to lure voters to their sides. What is worrisome, though, is how successful many of these parties have become. It is the growing potency of parties such as the British National Party, which more than quadrupled its slate of candidates between 1992 and 2001,³ which makes this a subject worth exploring further. As far as some people are

¹ Sen, 2010, p. 57
² Gould, 2010, p. 51
³ Ford and Goodwin, 2010, p. 2
concerned, these parties are not benign and may actually pose threats to democratic liberalism in general, based on some of their exclusionary, hard-line policies.

*How has continued EU expansion correlated with an increase in far-right nationalist parties’ success? Can a causal relationship be determined? Should the European Parliament expect more of a far-right presence in elections to come? What specific issues, if any, are typically linked to far-right successes?*

From a theoretical standpoint, we will continue to use the idea of ‘identity’ as a building block and an electoral motivator. The prevailing idea is that a strong nationalist identity movement can find success when pitted against a strongly liberal institution such as the EU. In this context, normative ideas of democracy, human rights and social cohesion are trumped by identity politics and fears over racial and economic vulnerability. This may be taken as a sign that no matter how much social, economic and political influence the EU ends up wielding, there will always be a backlash from outlying parties and the perception of the EU as a distributor of unequal favors. It is *how much* backlash and how mainstream these interests become that fuels our concern.

The idea that the EU’s supranational influence has increased in saliency (its importance as voting issue in the minds of citizens) on the national level in many states is not a new one. Peter Mair, for instance, picks up a definite pattern of behavior.

‘However, it is now striking to note how this pattern is beginning to spread — including to both the Netherlands and Austria during their 2002 elections, for example. Part of the reason for this, as van der Eijk and Franklin emphasize, is the simply the increased salience of the Europeanization dimension as such — Europe now counts for more …’\(^4\)

Mair’s research is also of note here because he specifically notices that fringe groups on both the left and the right may capitalize on discontent with the EU. While

\(^4\) Mair, 2005, p. 10
we acknowledge this, for our purposes in this paper, we will strictly be studying far-right parties.

In looking at parties for case studies, we will take note of the role their states play within the EU, including the lengths of their states’ memberships up to this point. We will try to keep the focus on the EU’s influence and how specific parties use this to their advantages. The existing literature takes ‘a quite rigid country-by-country-based approach, which fails to develop common theoretical perspectives.’\(^5\) While examining parties discretely, we will also attempt to discern notable patterns, as well as evidence that some parties are communicating agendas with each other across national borders.

In terms of EU-specific policies, we will look at those which most fit within our overarching theme of identity: migration and expansion. We will see that much of the far-right opposition to the EU goes back to the perceived infringement on nationalist identity, and use party literature itself to demonstrate that such policies often comprise the centerpiece of campaign platforms. The role of ‘identity’ in our research will be elaborated on in our methodology chapter.

Before continuing on to the review of literature and the methodology itself, we will be introduce the main nationalist parties discussed in this paper. We have selected five parties, each representing a different state within the EU. The parties vary somewhat in terms of electoral success, age and place along the political spectrum. However, all five typically share very similar policy platforms.

**The British National Party**
Led by Nick Griffin (elected to the European Parliament in 2009), the BNP is not as extreme as some of the other parties featured, but qualifies as a far-right nationalist group for the purposes of this paper.

The BNP’s manifesto makes use of psychological triggers such as repeated use of the words ‘Britain’ and ‘British,’ while strongly opposing anything, be it immigrants, military intervention or monetary aid, that might be construed as foreign. Notably, the BNP expresses outright aversion to the EU and advocates the

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\(^5\) Copsey, 1997, p. 101
goal of maintaining British ‘freedom.’ It also boasts of the party’s accelerating growth and its successes in local elections.

As we will see, the BNP’s main policy thrusts are immigration and employment, issues that resonate with its largely male, largely working-class base.

**The National Front**

France’s far-right nationalist party has its roots as far back as the 1970s, when European integration was not so far along as it is now. Both of its leaders, Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen, sit in the European Parliament.

The National Front’s 2007 program describes the EU as a ‘multi-tentacled hydra’ In a specific remark about the EU’s own normative agenda, the National Front derides the idea that the EU is based on values, not borders, claiming that such a statement is meant to usher Turkey into the fold. We will see later how Turkish entry into the EU is likely a strong factor at the heart of parties’ platforms.

The National Front is one of the more established parties in our case-study list, and is largely concerned with immigration and perceived tax-based inequality within the EU.

**The Party for Freedom**

This is the case study of the Netherlands, a party led by Geert Wilders that holds four seats in the European Parliament after the 2009 election. Like Griffin and the Le Pens, Wilders is a public, well-known figure, unafraid to be linked by name and facial recognition to his party. Following the 2002 assassination of Pim Fortuyn, Wilders was able to fill the political void that Fortuyn left behind.

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7 Copsey, 1997, p. 101


In a similar vein to both the BNP and the National Front, the Party for Freedom is strongly anti-immigrant and against the establishment of what the party’s 2010-2015 program calls a ‘European superstate.’

The Party for Freedom, as we will see, has the distinction of being formed on the basis of opposition to an EU policy proposal: the inclusion of Turkey.

**Jobbik**

Perhaps the furthest to the right of all these case-study parties, Jobbik of Hungary is also arguably the most fascinating from a campaign and public relations standpoint. Its leader, a former teacher named Gábor Vona, is young and prominently placed on the party’s website and in its campaign literature.

The party is rabidly anti-immigration, blames Hungary’s Roma population for many economic and social ills (i.e. unemployment) and produced a scathing manifesto against the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty (or the Lisbon Treason, the Vona refers to it).

Jobbik will feature prominently in this paper given its hard-line policy stances as well as its admittedly impressive political savvy — its website and literature are available in Hungarian and English, suggesting that it actively seeks acknowledgement and attention from the English-speaking west. Some of its literature also suggests that, despite its inward-looking policies that appeal to disillusioned Hungarians, the party is also open to partnerships with far-right groups in other states. Alone of the parties used as case studies, Jobbik also maintains its own armed forces, the Magyar Gárdak foot soldiers.

**The Freedom Party of Austria**

The final major party discussed in this paper is the Freedom Party of Austria, which currently holds two seats in the European Parliament. It is led by Heinz-Christian Strache. The Freedom Party, like Jobbik, also shows signs of

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campaigning shrewdness: It boasts its own YouTube channel, Facebook page and Flickr account.

The Freedom Party is not only skeptical of the EU as a whole, but its manifestos also imply a large distrust in France and Germany, which Strache implies are attempting to overly centralize EU power at the expense of smaller states.\textsuperscript{12}

The Freedom Party is notable in that it started out as being pro-EU and gradually shifted to an opposing perspective over time. It is also heavily concerned with maintaining the Germanic language and culture within Austria. Corresponding with the party’s platforms, all of its campaign materials are in German.

These five parties will form the case-study backbone of this paper. We will see more about their respective positions and prevailing academic opinions on them in the literature review, while the methodology will further examine their individual program proposals as well as their electoral results over time, in a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis. The methodology will also provide an overview of definitions, so we will have a grasp of what, precisely, constitutes a far-right party. It will also contain a longer explanation of our theoretical approach and explain what we will be looking for in our case studies.

Following our methodology and research overview, we will examine our findings on a case-by-case basis before coming to a conclusion.

The goal of this paper is to somewhat bridge the gap between studying far-right nationalist parties solely on the state level, and studying a monolithic right-wing rise in a pan-European context. The attempt here is to view national trends through a supranational lens. The EU is a dominant figure in its current manifestation, but there may be reason to believe that any further attempt at increased centralization will result in these parties solidifying their own power bases. If we can successfully find patterns in our analysis, we may be able to speculate as to what policy positions have the most effect on a party’s success — or else find other common denominators that we may have missed.

\textsuperscript{12} Strache, 2011, http://www.hcstrache.at/2011/?id=60&newsid=2578
The story of the EU and its members’ far-right backlash parties is an ironic one, in which a bastion of liberal ideals inadvertently creates decidedly illiberal electoral foes. When we draw our conclusions based on our case-study findings, we will also attempt to explain how anti-EU parties somehow end up holding EU leadership positions. The desire of anti-EU groups to join the EU on the parliamentary level is a fascinating one, and as we will see, numerous far-right parties have achieved success in that regard.

We may have legitimate reason to believe that any of these parties could represent a threat to democratic ideals. For this reason, it is crucial to understand and explain their appeal to voters, and the EU’s role in it.
II. Review of Literature

This chapter will provide an overview of existing literature on the subject of rising nationalist parties within the European Union’s member states. We will examine the literature according to the specific states each piece addresses, as well as those works that discuss Europe as a whole.

Much of the literature offers contrasts between long-term members of the EU and those that have only recently joined. By looking at these contrasts, we can detect how specific varieties of extreme nationalism came to evolve. We can also consider the EU as a whole and perhaps extrapolate how nationalist movements might have emerged from its policies.

Josef Janning, in a report for *International Affairs*, notes that a clear demarcation exists between the older member states of the EU and the newer ones.

‘The majority of new members do not have the diplomatic experience gained by the old members in past negotiations; many do not subscribe to the supranational tradition of European integration, and quite a few seem uncomfortable with the EU power structure and its core coalitions.’\(^{13}\)

Janning also speaks about the deterioration of the old Franco-German balance of power in the face of new coalition members. He paints a picture of an EU with ‘fragmentation’\(^{14}\) between large and small states; we might even wonder if an increased nationalistic behavior on the state level is in response to feeling anonymous and isolated within the EU itself. He concludes that the EU’s future rests on the behavior and decisions made within its individual states, notably the United Kingdom.\(^{15}\)

In “Mis-Selling Europe,” Erik Jones presents the EU as something of a failure, with unmet expectations and a poor record on employment. He also suggests that through enlargement, ‘the old member states have woken up to the fact that the new

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\(^{13}\) Janning, 2005, pp. 822-823

\(^{14}\) Janning, 2005, p. 828

\(^{15}\) Janning, 2005, p. 833
members mean new competitors in the European marketplace and new costs for European programmes.  

Like Janning, Jones has definitely noticed a dichotomy between the behaviors of old states and new states. Also like Janning, Jones concludes that the creation of a seamless European super-state is the wrong approach; rather, ‘Europeans should be more worried about the strength of their national democratic institutions than about building some highly articulated Europe democracy.’

Following this line of considering how more veteran member states regard their EU membership, Hanspeter Kriesi has specifically studied the role that European integration has played in national-level elections. In a nod to Peter Mair’s 2001 study, in which he concluded that Europe did not play a major role in its members’ national elections, Kriesi suggests that perhaps nationalist parties’ anti-Europe stances simply go along with their fringe ideologies in general. That is to say, voters who would back the National Front or the Austrian Freedom Party would do so anyway, and that other dimensions exist to explain their appeal that have little or nothing to do with the EU.

Kriesi immediately counters this, however, and next discusses a 2004 study by Cees Van der Eijk and Mark N. Franklin. This report found that while voters and their parties of choice were ideologically aligned in the late 1980s, by the late 1990s, a gap of sorts existed between how Europeans regarded tighter integration and what their political parties were willing to offer; in essence, there was a discontent demographic ‘waiting to be exploited by a political entrepreneur.’ In the case of European integration, certain political parties adapted their own ideological frameworks in order to fit an emerging eurosceptic niche in the electoral ‘market.’

The overarching hypothesis of Kriesi’s work, information from which was invaluable to this paper, is simply that Euroscepticism has created a ‘structural conflict’ within European politics. In his model, right-wing populists have painted

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16 Jones, 2006, p. 19
17 Jones, 2006, p. 19
18 Kriesi, 2007, p. 84
19 Kriesi, 2007, p. 85
20 Kriesi, 2007, p. 85
the EU as an ivory-tower elitist institution, a natural populist enemy — the right drums up support based on fears over immigration and national sovereignty. As discussed elsewhere in this paper, Kriesi found that the issue of European integration gained salience from the 1970s to the 1990s. He also found that voters were more likely to respond to euroscepticism in states that had been eurosceptic to begin with.

Somdeep Sen’s research on emerging far-right parties in the EU was also an invaluable resource. Sen begins by defining the exact framework within which the EU defines itself — namely as a cohesive international actor with a sound, expressed commitment to liberalism and human rights. While acknowledging that right-wing populism is emerging in more established member states, Sen’s alarmism is mainly aimed at eastern European member states’ parties — namely Jobbik in Hungary and Freedom Party of Austria and Alliance for the Future of Austria. The Austrian parties in particular, he notes, heavily stress anti-European and anti-immigration sentiments.

There is also concern about Italy, where the Lega Nord entered into a coalition with Silvio Berlusconi’s Popolo della Liberta party and actually increased its regional electoral share from 5.7% in 2005 to 12.7% in 2010. The electoral results of France’s National Front — which peaked nationally in 1986 (only to make a 2010 comeback) — may be used as anecdotal evidence that far-right populist parties’ support may come in waves. Sen’s conclusion is an interesting one — successful far-right parties may not be the product of backlash against the EU, but rather the result of ‘the erosion of the universal values of the EU within its borders.’ More ominously, the infiltration of such parties into the supranational EU institutions ‘could change the very character of the EU as an institution and therefore compromise its value-based role as an international actor.’

21 Kriesi, 2007, p. 86
22 Sen, 2010, pp. 57-59
23 Sen, 2010, p. 60
24 Sen, 2010, p. 61
25 Sen, 2010, p. 61
26 Sen, 2010, p. 65
27 Sen, 2010, p. 65
Writing from the standpoint of European security studies, Elena Kulinska notes the more recent (2010 and later) successes of fringe parties. Like Sen, her sights are set largely on the National Front and Jobbik. Kulinska is mainly concerned with whether these far-right actors are entirely new political animals, or whether they are merely fringe groups adapting to new political environments. In this way, her work is reminiscent of Janning’s.

She acknowledges that the IR field is constrained somewhat because no set definition of ‘far-right’ exists — she decides to refer to the parties as the ‘extreme right,’ and is of the opinion that merely calling them ‘far right’ dampens their more severe policies. Kulinska’s markers for the extreme right are used elsewhere in this paper and generally include: political radicalism; extreme nationalism; ideological rigidity; and populist rhetoric, while she includes immigration policy; views on the role of the EU and leadership style as track-able behaviors.

In addition to rampant xenophobia and racism (Kulinska suggests that Jobbik is likely the worst offender, or at least the most blatant), anti-EU sentiments also run through extreme-right parties. In Austria, for example, the Freedom Party has platforms that oppose EU intervention in Austrian affairs, cap Austria’s contributions to the EU, and oppose Turkish membership.

Kulinska concludes that the emergence of the far right (or extreme right, to use her wording) is not so much an entirely new phenomenon, but rather an ‘intensification’ of an existing ideological framework. Her analysis of electoral results is included elsewhere in this paper.

Migration and immigration play an extremely important role in far-right parties’ ideologies and their electoral platforms. Namely, the European Union’s support for a free flow of labor between member states seems to exacerbate anti-immigration feelings. Writing for a publication anthology geared toward studying European integration, Robert Gould specifically addresses the far right’s approach to immigrants and minorities.

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28 Kulinska, 2010, p. 52
29 Kulinska, 2010, p. 53
30 Kulinska, 2010, p. 56
31 Kulinska, 2010, p. 57
Gould is especially interested in the actual execution of political campaigns and the psychological payoff they create. He studies not only the messages, but also the media in which those messages exist. For example, he acknowledges that both Jobbik and the British National Party have slick, professional websites with impressive interlinking content and articles.\(^{32}\)

There is also evidence that these parties are watching and learning from each other’s behavior. He uses as an example an anti-minaret (read: anti-Muslim) poster created by artist Alexander Segert for the *Schweizerische Volkspartei* (SVP), which was later co-opted by the BNP. The anecdote is taken as a suggestion, perhaps even a warning, that such parties are more closely communicative with each other than one might expect.\(^{33}\) The anti-Muslim sentiment dovetails neatly into anti-EU sentiment, namely because fringe parties can sell the fear of Turkey entering the EU to their members.

In essence, Gould sees support for far-right parties as being tied inexplicably to identity. External forces — immigrants and the EU — threaten to dissolve certain homogenous national identities, and citizens in these countries turn to right-wing populist parties, thinking that they can preserve this integrity of identity.\(^{34}\) Parties like Jobbik are also obsessed with minorities such as the Roma, which they view as a cultural, ethnic and numerical (in terms of population makeup) threat.

Brigid Laffan is also interested in how identity politics shape European integration. She introduces the idea that the politicization of European integration began with Maastricht, and that much of the divisiveness we see now is a direct result of partisan opposition to the TEU.\(^{35}\) This particular paper is fascinating because, given its 1996 publication, it was able to somewhat predict some of the more pressing issues of identity that Gould was able to discuss more than a decade and a half later.

‘Uncertain identities at the national and local level feed into debates about the desirability and feasibility of a European identity which may be essential if the

\(^{32}\) Gould, 2010, p. 56
\(^{33}\) Gould, 2010, p. 50
\(^{34}\) Gould, 2010, p. 51
\(^{35}\) Laffan, 1996, p. 82
European Union is to enhance its legitimacy and become a genuine political realm.\footnote{Laffan, 1996, p. 83}

What can we take from this? In hindsight, the above statement could infer any number of developments. Did these debates fail, given that so much strife continues to exist in the EU in regards to national identity? Laffan stresses the importance of cementing community ties and feelings of inclusion, not just working to hammer out policy and build institutions.\footnote{Laffan, 1996, p. 83}

In discussing the roots of nationalism and state legitimacy — namely, that the success of the nation state depends on a combination of power and community — Laffan wonders if feelings of nationalism among EU citizens won’t one day clash with encouraged feelings of Europeanism.\footnote{Laffan, 1996, p. 85} In contrasting Germany, Italy and France, Laffan suggests that Germany and Italy attempted to imprint their national identities on the new European framework, while France actively sought to keep its European and national identities separate.\footnote{Laffan, 1996, p. 86}

Most interestingly, Laffan seems able to predict that Eastern European states would one day join their Western European brethren in the EU, and wonders if the divergent traditions of the regions will cause trouble if and when that time comes. She notes that ‘a strong correlation between religion, ethnicity, language and nationality developed in Eastern Europe; peoples were forced to develop their nationality on an ethnic basis and not within secure states.’\footnote{Laffan, 1996, pp. 91-92} This appears to be an excellent early indication that groups such as Jobbik would eventually face Europe with a rabid sense of ethnic solidarity. One might even call it something of a warning.

Having established a portrait of literature discussing the EU in a broader sense, we will now examine work that approaches states on an individual basis.

In the case of France, John W.P. Veugelers studies the rise of the National Front through the lens of Postmaterialist Theory (PMT). Using this framework,
Veugelers hypothesizes that economic and political stability has eroded old class-based voting behaviors and replaced them with platforms based on issues-focused ideas such as minority rights, the environment and disarmament.\textsuperscript{41} Veugelers also suggests that a right-side structural shift has accompanied a left-side one, which explains more hard-line stances on social issues like abortion, religion, nationalism and gay rights.\textsuperscript{42}

Veugelers creates a broad profile of the average National Front supporter. The party is especially strong in young adults aged 18-24, which actually serves to undermine the role that PMT might play.\textsuperscript{43} PMT relies on some level of life experience and most strongly correlates to voters who were born from 1930-1960 and had specific post-war comings-of-age; in that sense, the youth support for the National Front can’t readily be explained by PMT.\textsuperscript{44}

Nigel Copsey also looks at the far-right evolution in France, and notes in his introduction that ‘existing literature on the contemporary extreme right tends to follow a quite rigid country by country-based approach which fails to develop common theoretical perspectives.’\textsuperscript{45} Copsey produces a model that succinctly shows how alienation within the population combined with ultra-nationalism funneled through a political group can achieve some mainstream political legitimacy, or at least a place in public debate.\textsuperscript{46}

Copsey traces the National Front’s earliest successes back to the late 1970s, suggesting that it was finally exploiting immigration fears that led to the party’s heyday. He calls it ‘instrumental in the electoral emergence of the FN as the political unfolding of the immigration issue threw open the window of opportunity for Le Pen and carried the FN into legitimate political space …’.\textsuperscript{47}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{41}Veugelers, 2000, p. 20
\bibitem{42}Veugelers, 2000, p. 21
\bibitem{43}Veugelers, 2000, p. 28
\bibitem{44}Veugelers, 2000, p. 28
\bibitem{45}Copsey, 1997, p. 101
\bibitem{46}Copsey, 1997, p. 105
\bibitem{47}Copsey, 1997, p. 108
\end{thebibliography}
France’s preoccupation with immigration is also a factor in the success of the BNP in the United Kingdom. While the BNP is far right by British standards, it is comparatively tame next to other European fringe groups (e.g. Jobbik). However, for the purposes of this paper, it is still considered a far-right nationalist organization. Robert Ford and Matthew J. Goodwin examined BNP support predictors in much the same way that Copsey tried to ferret out markers that indicate support for the National Front.

Whereas Copsey laments the absence of a pan-European approach to literature, Ford and Goodwin take the opposite approach, claiming that extreme-right studies are too European-focused and not focused enough on individual states, namely Britain.48

The patterns that emerge from Ford and Goodwin’s take on the typical BNP supporter are familiar: northern white males belonging to the working class, with little higher education; unlike the young-adult driven NF in France, BNP voters tend to be older.49 The BNP represents a living example of Sen’s fear — it is a nationalist, eurosceptic organization that nonetheless has succeeded in gaining a foothold in the institution that it distrusts (the European Parliament, in which the BNP won two seats in June 2009). The theme of identity politics reemerges: ‘Voters choose a party because of who they are are rather than what they want’50 (emphasis mine).

Like their ilk on the continent, BNP supporters tend to emphasize immigration and distrust in the political elite, of which the EU represents the pinnacle.51 Interestingly, Ford and Goodwin conclude that the BNP siphons support from the Labour Party most of all, the implication being that a demographic that might be drawn to Labour’s pro-working class policies would turn to the BNP when immigration and fears about European integration were trump platforms.52 They also provide a wealth of polling data, which is discussed elsewhere in this paper.

48 Ford and Goodwin, 2010, p. 2
49 Ford and Goodwin, 2010, p. 3
50 Ford and Goodwin, 2010, p. 4
51 Ford and Goodwin, 2010, p. 7
52 Ford and Goodwin, 2010, p. 21
Stuart Wilks-Heeg also chooses the BNP as the subject of his paper, in which he attempts to explain its more recent success. He points out that the far right in Britain had gone from a mere six local electoral victories from 1921 to 2001, to fielding 754 candidates and gaining 300,000 votes in 2007. Wilks-Heeg’s article serves as a warning against writing off the BNP as merely a fringe group with limited support.

For the purposes of this paper, it is extremely noteworthy that Wilks-Heeg considers the BNP to be ‘a distinctly twenty-first century phenomenon,’ in the sense that such an evolution makes it even easier and more fascinating to view the rise of the BNP through the lens of the EU’s own expansion. The BNP’s early success in the first decade of the twenty-first century came largely in northern industrial towns; it was only in 2006 when the BNP successively contested council seats in Barking and Dagenham that the party broke out of its highly regionalized niche. Like Gould, Wilks-Heeg also expresses some level of admiration for the BNP’s ground-level support structure. The BNP’s narrative, he suggests, is one of strategy and polish as much as anything else.

We will move to the continent now and examine literature regarding the Netherlands, and Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom. The Netherlands is an especially interesting case, given its comparative lack of eurosceptism and, until recently, rather mellow political scene. Koen Vossen, in his paper on Dutch populism, explicitly calls the shakeup in Dutch affairs a product of the turn of the century and points to political assassinations and highly unpredictable elections as causes of Wilders’ party’s emergence.

When working to define populism, Vossen concludes that whatever it is, its main feature is the opposition of a good homogenous side with some malicious ‘other.’ Vossen spends much of his paper trying to determine whether Geert Wilders actually fits the definition of a populist. He concludes that Wilders does in some ways

53 Wilks-Heeg, 2007, p. 377
54 Wilks-Heeg, 2007, p. 378
55 Wilks-Heeg, 2007, p. 382
56 Vossen, 2010, p. 22
57 Vossen, 2010, p. 23
— disdain for the elite, adherence to conspiracy theories — and doesn’t in others —
Wilders is not a reluctant politician.\textsuperscript{58} Wilders admits that determining the extent of
Wilders’ populism was the main thrust of his article; this is useful in working to
determine how the Party for Freedom gains and maintains support.

Kees Aarts and Henk van der Kolk also write about the far right in the
Netherlands; right out of the gate, they affirm the Dutch’s past support for European
integration. Back in the 1970s, roughly three out of four Dutch citizens supported EU
membership, more than in Germany or France.\textsuperscript{59} Their paper works to reconcile this
robust past support with the 2005 rejection of the European Constitution. In essence,
the Dutch electorate shifted to the point where a leader like Wilders had substantial
appeal. Tellingly, Aarts and van der Kolk trace Wilders’ founding the Party for
Freedom directly back to his opposition over Turkey joining the EU and specific
threats to Dutch national culture (again, identity is a main factor).\textsuperscript{60}

Finally in this literature overview, we will examine writings about Hungary
and more specifically, Jobbik, its own extreme-right party. Attila Antal describes
Jobbik’s success in the 2009 European Parliament elections by noting that the early
polling underestimated Jobbik’s success somewhat, predicting one or two seats for the
party when it actually won three.\textsuperscript{61} Perhaps the biggest cause for alarm is not the
number of seats or share of the vote that Jobbik received, but rather the electoral
turnout: 31.36\% Hungarians voted\textsuperscript{62}, suggesting that Jobbik was able to work up a fair
level of support among politically aware and/or active voters.

Antal also suggests that the center-right party Fidesz, despite picking up a
substantial number of seats in that same election, will one day have to reconcile with
Jobbik and acknowledge the two parties’ slightly overlapping demographics. Again,
there is a strong emphasis on electoral campaign literature: Jobbik’s campaign called
the EU ‘a money-eating, bureaucratic, evil empire … (that was) against small

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{58} Vossen, 2010, p. 27
  \item \textsuperscript{59} Aarts and van der Kolk, 2006, p. 243
  \item \textsuperscript{60} Aarts and van der Kolk, 2006, p. 245
  \item \textsuperscript{61} Antal, 2009, p. 5
  \item \textsuperscript{62} Antal, 2009, p. 5
\end{itemize}
citizens.’ When describing Jobbik’s program (platform), Antal calls it ‘more than a European program,’ mentioning the EU only to criticize it but otherwise focusing on national affairs. In this way, Jobbik successfully linked domestic social concerns with a broader European Parliament election, linking nationalism with supranational concerns.

Given the relative newness of Jobbik, much of its presence is in the realm of new media and journalistic articles. It is an interesting case because its present and future are unfolding right now, through online manifestos and YouTube. It serves as a useful marker in not only studying the east-west dichotomy of various fringe groups, but also the power of online viral campaigns. Looking at its slick presentations, bilingual manifestos and polished videos, it’s easy to forget the party’s hard-line xenophobia and euroscepticism. That may be precisely the point.

As we have seen from the literature, a broad spectrum of analysis exists on far-right behavior at both the national and supranational levels. It is, judging from this research, almost impossible to separate the EU as an international body from the sub-level political workings of its individual member states. The political behavior of states’ citizens seems to have at least some effect on the EU, regarding its potential institutional makeup (given the very real threat of far-right entities gaining power in EU governing bodies) and also its international and supranational legitimacy. At best, the democratic nature of the EU’s mission has allowed profoundly antidemocratic ideologies to prosper. At worst, these ideologies may one day alter the very fabric of the EU’s outward international mission of liberal democracy.

The overarching linking theme appears to be identity. Extremist parties come to power because citizens, whether they’re in Britain or Hungary or the Netherlands or France, worry about losing their national identities in the face of a changing political landscape. Put bluntly, European integration represents a level of transnational homogeneity that some people just aren’t ready for. There is also a very distinct dichotomy between old and new EU members, and those in the west versus those in the east. It appears that much of the strife in the west has to do with economic and employment concerns in addition to migration, whereas the attitudes in the east are more heavily reliant on religion and ethnicity. It remains to be seen how, exactly,

63 Antal, 2009, p. 13
64 Antal, 2009, p. 13
Europe will respond and adapt to the successes of these emerging parties, but it will be interesting to observe.
III. Definitions and Methods

In this part of the paper, we will provide a working conceptual definition of what constitutes a far-right party, while further building on our ‘identity’ framework and explaining how this research will make use of that framework. We will also look at each party’s specific platform proposals and their recent electoral performances, as well as academic analysis, in an effort to infer any possible causal relationships.

Our understanding of ‘far-right’ comes mainly from the writings of Hans-George Betz. His markers for far-right parties include: xenophobia; anti-elitism; opposition to social integration; and extreme nationalism.65 We can also look at Kulinska’s work for a more up-to-date set of indicators. As discussed in the literature review, these are: political radicalism; extreme nationalism; ideological rigidity; and populist rhetoric.66 All of the parties listed as case studies, to some extent, fit these markers, as well as Kulinska’s other behavioral signs such as anti-EU and anti-immigration sentiment. In order to prevent getting bogged down in semantics and attempting to identify the demarcation on the spectrum between ‘far’ and ‘extreme,’ we will not use Kulinska’s ‘extreme right’ terminology. To add perspective, however, it should be noted that a party such as Jobbik fits Kulinska’s definition of ‘extreme right.’67

We will hew to these definitions when working through our case studies, to avoid certain issues-based parties (such as the United Kingdom Independence Party) from erroneously being categorized as far right. While some parties in our case studies are further to the right than others, all may be considered ‘far right’ and are on the ideological fringe in their respective states.

As discussed in the introduction, our research question is to determine to what extent the EU’s influence affects the success of far-right nationalist parties in its member states. We have a case-study list that includes large and small, and old and new members. It is our broad expectation that the far-right parties included in our sample will show a marked increase in electoral popularity based on the role that the

65 Betz, 1994, p. 4

66 Kulinska, 2010, p. 53

67 Kulinska, 2010, p. 56
EU plays in national affairs, as evidenced by time as an $x$ factor — the longer the EU has an influence in a country (as determined by indicators such as EU membership), the more popular that country’s far-right parties will become. In the case of Jobbik, the party’s inception corresponds roughly with Hungary’s introduction to the EU, meaning that we should be able to follow its trajectory in a strong EU context. In our analysis chapter, when working to determine causation, we will also acknowledge possible domestic factors in an effort to judge the extent of purely European influences.

In terms of the framework of ‘identity,’ we use that term as an umbrella to encompass a set collection of homogenous national values, including linguistic integrity, ethnicity, religion and citizenship. It is our prediction that these more primal, uniform will eventually trump loftier liberal tenets as presented by the EU. In summation, the more local and immediate the classification, the more powerful it is electoral-wise, i.e. being French, Austrian, British, Dutch or Hungarian likely resonates more than being European. From that perspective, voters may be likelier to support parties that give them that level of immediate satisfaction in the face of a heterogeneous ‘other.’ In this context, we will pay special attention to parties that advocate specific cultural and ethnic characteristics in their campaign literature.

We will now examine each party in-depth, from both a qualitative and quantitative perspective. This is important, because numbers alone cannot always explain the driving force behind them, while it is equally difficult to gauge platforms’ success without a quantitative perspective. Studying both should help us link hard polling data with the ideas that led to those results.

Our research material is a combination of a variety of sources, in order to create the broadest possible portrait of each party. This includes academic journals, books, periodical coverage (including newspapers and magazines), electoral data and parties’ programs. We will thus be able to view each party from the critical perspective of an outsider and the sympathetic perspective of a party follower, in order to come to an educated conclusion regarding our research question.

**The British National Party**

We will begin by assessing the performance of the BNP in recent elections as well as its political platforms.
After peaking in the 1979 election, the BNP remained largely dormant until 1992, when it contested 13 constituencies and earned 7,005 votes.\textsuperscript{68} It is interesting, and perhaps important, to note that the 1992 general election took place soon after Conservative Prime Minister John Major had endorsed the Maastricht Treaty. During the 2005 general election, the BNP earned 192,746 votes and contested 119 seats.\textsuperscript{69} In a span of 13 years, the BNP increased its votes received by 2,651.5\% and its contested districts by 815.4\%. If nothing else, the expansion of the BNP’s support strongly correlates with the EU’s post-Maastricht consolidation of power, including the introduction of the euro.

Galina Borisyuk et al. examined the BNP’s performance in the 2004 European elections, noting that it can be difficult to determine the extent to which the BNP’s position on Europe was responsible for its support, given that UKIP, an issues-based party advocating the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, was available as a friendlier right option.\textsuperscript{70}

The 2009 European elections were a substantial victory for the BNP, as it earned seats in the European Parliament for the first time. Despite the low raw number of seats gained, the BNP gained more seats than any of the other major parties (the Conservatives, UKIP and the Liberal Democrats each gained one seat, while Labour lost 5 and other parties remained stagnant).\textsuperscript{71} This was the election in which the BNP came second in Barking and Dagenham and began gaining more national attention. Given that, the BNP was still the strongest in the north.

Ford and Goodwin, in studying attitudinal markers in BNP supporters, found that Nick Griffin has followed the example of other far-right parties, namely the National Front in France, in an effort to expand support.\textsuperscript{72} Wilks-Heeg also notes that Griffin is modeling the BNP on the National Front, by recruiting more female

\textsuperscript{68} Ford and Goodwin, 2010, p. 2

\textsuperscript{69} Ford and Goodwin, 2010, p. 2

\textsuperscript{70} Borisyuk et al., 2007, p. 672

\textsuperscript{71} House of Commons Library, European Parliament Elections 2009, p. 2

\textsuperscript{72} Ford and Goodwin, 2010, p. 4
candidates and working to shake off the suggestion of racism and violence.\textsuperscript{73} This is just one example of how nationalist parties have adopted each other’s behavior.

From a qualitative perspective, the BNP’s proposals regarding the EU are quite firm. The BNP’s foreign affairs policy brief asserts the party’s support for the pound and its resistance to EU interference. It must be noted that the BNP does not express hostility toward individual European states, but rather to the EU as a whole. Above an enormous graphic of the British flag, BNP text tells voters that the party seeks to withdraw entirely from the EU and build closer ties to Commonwealth states such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand.\textsuperscript{74} This gravitation toward states that are the closest to Britain in terms of religion, language and ethnic makeup seem to indicate the power of ‘identity’ at work. There is a clear effort on the part of the BNP, through the use of photos, colors and loaded language, to entrench itself psychologically in voters’ minds and to be synonymous with what it means to be ‘British.’

Ford and Goodwin support the role that identity plays within the BNP, as shown earlier in the literature review. They also show that the BNP’s strongest support comes from areas that are economically deprived and have large minority populations.\textsuperscript{75} Their other data describes a typical BNP voter based on psychographic data. From polling data from 2002-2006, Ford and Goodwin found that the BNP’s support was overrepresented in men aged 35-54, who were semi-skilled or skilled manually, employed full-time, who rented their property and who came from the West Midlands and the North.\textsuperscript{76} A BNP supporter is likelier to have immigration as a top priority (curiously enough, the EU rates last with education), and to be dissatisfied with government at virtually all levels and across all parties.\textsuperscript{77} In terms of actual predictors, Ford and Goodwin found that gender and education had the strongest

\textsuperscript{73} Wilks-Heeg, 2009, p. 385


\textsuperscript{75} Ford and Goodwin, 2010, p. 7

\textsuperscript{76} Ford and Goodwin, 2010, p. 9

\textsuperscript{77} Ford and Goodwin, 2010, p. 12
impact — men were more than twice as likely to support the BNP than women, and
the same was true of the uneducated compared with the degreed.78

Given this, we can surmise that the BNP most definitely appeals to a
predictable — male, working-class, northern — demographic, wary of immigration.

The National Front

Our next case study will trace the background of the National Front in France. The National Front is one of the older far-right parties still in existence; its inception goes back to the 1970s, which corresponds to the original consolidation of the European community.

Copsey attributes the National Front’s poor showings in the 1970s to a number of issues, namely a lack of a mobilizing concern and a poor execution of campaign strategy.79 Following this, he attributes the National Front’s reemergence in the 1980s to a media willing to give Jean-Marie Le Pen a platform and to the rise of immigration as a national concern.80

Jocelyn A.J. Evans examines the foreign policy aims of the National Front in a historical context, and suggests that much of it is derived from a backlash against heavily pro-Europe forces.81 She sums up the National Front’s opinion on the current European political alignment as ‘entirely erroneous.’82 Like the BNP, which positions itself as anti-Europe but not anti-European states, the National Front seems in favor of economic links with European nation-states, as long as nation-states remain the unit of analysis.

Despite the National Front’s weak electoral presence at the time, its ‘no’ position on the May 2005 referendum in France on the European Constitution nonetheless emerged victorious. Evans suggests that the right painted the referendum

78 Ford and Goodwin, 2010, p. 18
79 Copsey, 1997, p. 106
80 Copsey, 1997, p. 108
81 Evans, 2007, p. 127
82 Evans, 2007, p. 133
as being about the eventual inclusion of Turkey within the EU.\(^{83}\) We will see this again.

The National Front has seen its influence in France ebb and flow considerably during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. Perhaps the height of its triumph on the national level came in 2002, when Jean-Marie Le Pen defeated Lionel Jospin and made it to the second round of a run-off. This success eluded the party for the rest of the 2000s decade — it lost four seats in the European Parliament from 2004 to 2009, for instance.\(^{84}\) It may have some future signs of life, though, as evidenced by strong regional showings in the March 2010 elections, in which the party surprisingly gained almost 12% of the national vote.\(^{85}\) There is evidence that such support may be cyclical, as evidenced by a 1992 paper by Peter Fysh and Jim Wolfreys that marvels at the party’s high level of success in the 1980s.\(^{86}\)

Like the BNP, the National Front has a savvy Web presence and an extensive collection of literature related to its policy programs. Marine Le Pen has facial prominence on the party’s website, showing the transition from father to daughter in party leadership. Its 2012 program has yet to be officially unveiled, but its 2007 program remains available to view, with a full complement of diverse policy briefs.

The top billing on its EU policy page is reserved for the party’s policy success in seeing the European Constitution voted down in 2005. Much of the National Front’s opposition to the EU is economic and takes the form of taxation protests. It is especially critical of Europe’s approach to illegal immigration. Frontex, a 2005 creation meant to monitor Europe’s external borders is, for example, ‘expensive … and ridiculous.’\(^{87}\) Somewhat bizarrely, the National Front seems to think the World Bank will actively import immigrants into Europe in order to maintain certain levels of labor.\(^{88}\)

\(^{83}\) Evans, 2007, p. 133

\(^{84}\) House of Commons Library, European Parliament Elections 2009, p. 31


\(^{86}\) Fysh and Wolfreys, 1992, p. 309

\(^{87}\) The National Front, 2007 program, http://www.frontnational.com/?page_id=1185

\(^{88}\) The National Front, 2007 program, http://www.frontnational.com/?page_id=1185
State sovereignty and a resistance to globalization are strong foci of the National Front’s European program. Included in its platforms are the renegotiation of treaties, the outright rejection of any sort of European-derived citizenship and the renunciation of the Schengen agreement, which the party holds responsible for immigration problems.\textsuperscript{89} Much of its immigration and EU positions seem to stem from a fear of Turkey joining the EU.

Based on Stephanie Giry’s research, this should not come as a surprise. While noting that Muslim assimilation in France is quite high — 20-30\% of Algerian-descended women in France married a French man\textsuperscript{90} — she also reports that Islam nonetheless has strains with modern French culture. It should be expected then that a nationalist, xenophobic political party like the National Front would be leery of extending EU membership to a Muslim state such as Turkey. Giry reports though that Muslims in France vote in the same manner as other people of their socioeconomic backgrounds; religion played little role in their electoral behavior.\textsuperscript{91}

**The Party for Freedom**

More so than perhaps any other party discussed in this paper, the Dutch Party for Freedom is, in essence, a one-man show — Geert Wilders’ show.

Wilders emerged as a political heir of sorts to Pim Fortuyn, who was assassinated in 2002. Vossen suggests that Wilders’ ascent to power was made easier based on the volatility surrounding Fortuyn’s death, the 2004 assassination of Theo van Gogh and the Dutch rejection of the European Constitution in 2005.\textsuperscript{92}

Wilders founded the Party for Freedom in 2005, and the party began to show electoral success fairly quickly. It received 5.9\% of the votes in the 2006 elections, which translated, through the Dutch balloting system, to nine seats in parliament.\textsuperscript{93} This influence increased for the 2009 European elections, in which the Party for Freedom won about 17\% of the vote and gained four seats in the European

\textsuperscript{89} The National Front, 2007 program, http://www.frontnational.com/?page_id=1185
\textsuperscript{90} Giry, 2006, p. 93
\textsuperscript{91} Giry, 2006, p. 96
\textsuperscript{92} Vossen, 2010, p. 22-23
\textsuperscript{93} Vossen, 2010, p. 23
Parliament.\textsuperscript{94} The standout feature of this election was that Wilders’ party emerged as the second-place finisher, evidence that it was not easily written off as a fringe movement.

As he works to determine if Wilders fits the proper definition of a populist, Vossen notes that Wilders fits two primary categories: disdain for the political elite and the support of conspiracy theories.\textsuperscript{95} These also dovetail well with the Party for Freedom’s rejection of the EU — the EU represents the pinnacle of the political elite, while also working to undermine Dutch national identity by allowing political Islam to gain a foothold through immigration and expansion into Turkey.

Vossen concludes his remarks by calling Wilders’ party ‘the main party for exploiting popular dissatisfaction in the Netherlands.’\textsuperscript{96} In other words, Wilders saw a political niche that he had the opportunity to exploit, and he took that opportunity.

While Vossen worked to categorize Wilders as a politician, Aarts and van der Kolk attempted to explain how the Netherlands, ‘among the staunchest supporters of European integration,’\textsuperscript{97} could have soundly rejected, in a 62-38% vote with a 63% turnout, the European Constitution referendum in 2005.\textsuperscript{98} Similar to the National Front’s aversion to Turkish EU members, the two find that much of the growing distaste for the EU in the Netherlands stems from the entity’s eastward expansion. More specifically, they contend that a gap has always existed between the general population and the liberal political elite, but that the gap was made obvious due to the use of a referendum.\textsuperscript{99}

Aarts and van der Kolk corroborate Vossen’s assertion that EU expansion into Turkey played a significant role in the campaign against the European Constitution. More than that, Turkish membership was the very reason that Wilders left his post within the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy to found the Party for Freedom.

\textsuperscript{94} House of Commons Library, European Parliament Elections 2009, p. 36

\textsuperscript{95} Vossen, 2010, p. 26

\textsuperscript{96} Vossen, 2010, p. 35

\textsuperscript{97} Aarts and van der Kolk, 2006, p. 243

\textsuperscript{98} Aarts and van der Kolk, 2006, p. 243

\textsuperscript{99} Aarts and van der Kolk, 2006, p. 243
in the first place.\textsuperscript{100} In the Netherlands, as elsewhere, the issue of national identity still appears to be paramount.

Aarts and van der Kolk conducted surveys among Dutch citizens to gauge their attitudes toward the EU and its expansion. Those likeliest to vote against the European Constitution were also those who feared the most for the future of the Dutch language, culture and economy.\textsuperscript{101}

The Party for Freedom’s campaign literature, in keeping with its anti-Islamic attitudes, claims to support Judeo-Christian values, while also frowning on what it refers to as a European superstate.\textsuperscript{102} This same program, which runs from 2010-2015, calls the EU an attack on democracy, compares it to the former Soviet Union and accuses it of having no democratic legitimacy. Conspiracy theories indeed.

In a crass example of exploitive identity politics, the program paints Muslim immigrants as benefits sponges and declares that (the very Dutch-named) ‘Henk and Ingrid pay for Ali and Fatima.’\textsuperscript{103} Turkey’s EU membership, unsurprisingly, is a major hinge: ‘Turkije er in, Nederland er uit.’\textsuperscript{104} In this way, the fear of Islam and the distrust of the EU become inexorably linked in the party’s platform. The Party for Freedom demands an opt-out clause, so that the EU has no say in Dutch immigration policies. The contempt for ‘that club in Brussels’\textsuperscript{105} is palpable when reading the program.

More so than its British or French counterparts, the Party for Freedom seems to place immigration \textit{in the context of the EU} at the forefront of its campaigns. That will be a primary observation in our analysis. That the party grew from the political dissatisfaction of a single MP into the second-largest party in the European elections

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Aarts and van der Kolk, 2006, p. 244
\item Aarts and van der Kolk, 2006, p. 245
\end{enumerate}
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in less than five years in remarkable — and we can’t help but wonder what truly caused the party’s meteoric rise.

**Jobbik**

Jobbik is this paper’s representation in the realm of eastern European states that are new to the European Union; Hungary joined in May 2004 after voting overwhelmingly to join the EU by referendum in 1997. Jobbik traces its roots back to October 2003 as a coalition of university students — the party describes itself as ‘principles, conservative and radically patriotic.’

Jobbik’s online presence, one notices immediately, is extremely savvy. Alone of the parties discussed here (other than the BNP), Jobbik provides a purpose-built English-language site. Its presentation, anchored by the smiling, photogenic face of party leader Gábor Vona, is, for lack of a better word, slick.

Attila Antal’s summation of Jobbik’s opinion of the EU was included in the literature review, but it bears repeating: ‘the EU is a money-eating, bureaucratic, evil empire …’. It is this sentiment that has coincided with the party’s growing domestic power.

*The Economist* noted Jobbik’s increased influence in June 2009, following the European Parliament elections. Jobbik gained three seats in the European Parliament and 427,000 votes. The magazine’s brief posits that perhaps Fidesz, Hungary’s centre-right party, helped enable the far-right party’s rise by casting too wide a net in its search for policy allies. It also includes anecdotes related to Jobbik’s reputation as being anti-Jewish and anti-Roma.

In May 2009, *The Telegraph* profiled European Parliament candidate Krisztina Morvai (Morvai went on to win one of Jobbik’s three seats that June). Calling Morvai a ‘cross between Hillary Clinton and … Nick Griffin’, the newspaper uses her as a poster woman for the European far-right movement leading up to the 2009 European elections. Among the anecdotes the newspaper includes is a references to Morvai’s

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107 Antal, 2009, p. 13


speeches, in which she invokes the idea EU buyer’s remorse among the Hungarian population. It is easy to see why a newspaper would focus on Morvai as a subject: She is educated, a lawyer and a mother. The juxtaposition of a warm, maternal personality with the hard-like political ideals of Jobbik makes for fascinating political journalism.

The Times’ Adam LeBor ran a story about Jobbik after the election, noting its 14.8% share of the vote with some alarm and including Hungary in a far-right narrative of eastern Europe that also includes parties in Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. Among the newspaper’s foci is the Magyar Gárda, Jobbik’s black-uniformed branch that many detractors compare to the Arrow Cross, a Hungarian Nazi movement.\(^{110}\)

As jarring as Jobbik’s 2009 European election success, even more shocking was the party’s performance in the 2010 Hungarian national elections. The party received 16.67% of the vote in the first round of voting, 12.26% in the second round and 47 seats in parliament, a third-place finish.\(^{111}\) This is made more impressive given the tepid results the party posted in the 2006 national elections (its first elections as a party), when it gained only 2.2% of the vote in the first round and walked away with no parliamentary seats.\(^{112}\) These results show that not only is Jobbik making a strong impression on national politics, but it is also doing so at an incredible rate.

In the wake of Jobbik’s 2010 national-level success, the EU Observer ran a piece that attempted to explain how a far-right party could break into the mainstream. The article quotes Budapest-based polling firm the Perspective Institute as suggesting that much of Jobbik’s support comes from disillusioned people on the left, not necessarily those with inherent far-right ideologies.\(^{113}\) The think tank Political Capital also reported that it found that roughly 21% of Hungarians were willing to consider far-right ideology; only Bulgaria had a larger ratio.\(^{114}\) More than that, where in the

\(^{110}\) Adam LeBor, The Times, June 9, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6457752.ece


past, disaffected youth had turned left, in Hungary they were turning right. The article concludes by suggesting that Fidesz should perhaps do more to counter Jobbik.

Jobbik’s English-language manifestos are impressively crisp. The Europe portion of its website features various outreach efforts to other like-minded parties in Europe. For instance, one article in this section expresses sympathy for ethnic Germans who were expelled from Czechoslovakia after World War II. The party also has its own YouTube channel, packed with speeches, propaganda ads and events footage.

Vona’s criticism of the Lisbon Treaty is given prominence on the site. He criticizes the two mainstream parties, Fidesz and the MSZP, for unanimously supporting the treaty’s ratification.\footnote{Vona: The Lisbon Treason, 2009, http://www.jobbik.com/jobbik-announcements/3128.html} Other pieces on the site criticize the EU for what Jobbik sees as unfair treatment of ethnic Hungarian minorities in other member states, especially in Slovakia and the Czech Republic.

**The Freedom Party of Austria**

Like the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, the Freedom Party cannot be easily written off as a minor nuisance on the fringe. Unlike its Dutch counterpart, it is not, notes Riedlsperger, a new party. Riedlsperger traces the Freedom Party’s history from 1956, when it had more in common ideologically with German national-liberal politics.\footnote{Riedlsperger, 1998, p. 27} Its transformation into the far-right populist party that it is today began in 1986 when Jörg Haider assumed leadership. Since then, Riedlsperger says, the Freedom Party has continuously increased its electoral share; currently it is the third-largest party in the national government.\footnote{Riedlsperger, 1998, p. 27} Haider’s departure in 2005, when he formed the Alliance of the Future of Austria and left control of the Freedom Party to Heinz-Christian Strache, is the major blip in the party’s recent history.

After the split with Haider, the Freedom Party did extremely well in the 2006 general election, gaining three seats for a total of 21, from 11% of the vote.\footnote{Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2011, http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_wahlen/nationalrat/2006/start.aspx} In the
2008 elections, this share increased to 17.5%; combined with the results of Haider’s breakaway party, this meant that more than one in four Austrians had backed a far-right party in that election cycle.\(^\text{119}\) (Haider died in a car crash in 2008.)

Thomas Fillitz discusses Haider’s Freedom Party in the context of neo-nationalism. He asserts that if not for its immigration policy, the Freedom Party might actually be considered a liberal entity.\(^\text{120}\) Much of the party’s anti-immigrant sentiment, he suggests, comes from having a large number of eastern Europeans enter the country in the 1990s, after the fall of communism but before any of them had joined the EU. In the vein of identity politics, the party under Haider created an ‘Austria First’ referendum in 1993, which would have closed the state to immigration; earlier pronouncements in the late 1980s had reaffirmed Austria’s Germanic language and culture.\(^\text{121}\)

Kurt Richard Luther also wrote about the Freedom Party in 2000, five years before Haider left to form a splinter party. His work is fascinating to read with the benefit of hindsight. The party was actually very pro-European integration until it changed its policy position in 1994, when Austria voted to join the EU.\(^\text{122}\) From this point on, the Freedom Party has been strongly eurosceptic, using fears of the economic costs of eastern expansion as a cornerstone of its campaigns.\(^\text{123}\) In a very interesting development, Luther ends his report by asserting that the Freedom Party is not, strictly speaking, right-wing or extremist; he blames media coverage and Haider’s own personality for what he considers a mischaracterization of the party.\(^\text{124}\) More than that, he does not appear to believe that the Freedom Party poses any kind of serious risk to Austrian democracy; he is also skeptical that the Freedom Party could disrupt Austria’s role in the ‘European project.’\(^\text{125}\)


\(^{120}\) Fillitz, 2006, p. 141

\(^{121}\) Fillitz, 2006, p. 142

\(^{122}\) Luther, 2000, p. 430

\(^{123}\) Luther, 2000, p. 430

\(^{124}\) Luther, 2000, pp. 439-440

\(^{125}\) Luther, 2000, p. 440
The Freedom Party performed well in the 2009 European Parliament elections, picking up two seats, and remaining in third place behind the centre-right and centre-left mainstream Austrian parties.

The Freedom Party may be showing signs of overtaking one or both of the mainstream parties. In July 2011, *Der Spiegel* reported that Strache, the current leader of the Freedom Party, could very well be in a chancellor-in-waiting, given the robust performance that the Freedom Party was showing in various polls.\(^\text{126}\) Notably, Strache is framing his party’s agenda in the context of the EU bailout of Greece and painting the current chancellor, Werner Faymann, as an EU apologist.\(^\text{127}\)

The Freedom Party’s political program from June 2011 maintains its identification with Germany’s cultural and ethnic background, as well as its skepticism of the EU. Like the Dutch Party for Freedom’s program, this agenda also emphasizes the important role of Christianity within the Austrian state. Interestingly, the manifesto also includes sweeping descriptions about Austria’s Germanic history, as if using that as a way to announce its uniqueness.\(^\text{128}\) One of the prevailing words in the party’s literature — it may even be considered a theme — is *Heimat*, or home. Again, this shows a tendency to use identity-themed imagery to make a political connection with voters; this is not about a house, but the Vaterland. The Freedom Party is presenting itself as a keeper of Austrian national identity.

This sampling of five different far-right European parties provides a great deal of material from which to draw an analysis. The states from which the parties come all have unique experiences in terms of their European Union membership, based on date of entry into the EU and entry (or lack thereof) into the monetary union. We have seen how each party has performed both at the national and supranational levels in recent elections, as well as how the parties have framed the European Union in their campaign literature and programs. Some parties have shown cyclical behavior, while others have had a continuous increase in performance.

\(^{126}\) Mayr, July 14, 2001, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,774255,00.html

\(^{127}\) Mayr, July 14, 2001, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,774255,00.html

In the next chapter, we will go back to each party and use the qualitative and quantitative findings to attempt to determine causal links between the parties’ specific performance and the influence of the EU. Whether a causal link can be inferred or not, we will attempt to explain how and why that is the case. We will analyze each party using our theoretical framework of ‘identity’ in the face of normative liberalism. Finally, we will group the parties together, depending on causal links or lack thereof, and describe possible indicators and patterns of behavior. Using this material, we will draw a conclusion for our research questions.
IV. Analysis

In this chapter, we will critically evaluate what we have learned from each individual party’s background — both qualitative and quantitative — in order to gauge a causal link between the influence of the European Union and the success of the far-right parties included in our case study.

Each party’s analysis will examine the trend of its electoral growth; that is to say, we will assert that the party is growing, fading or behaving cyclically. We will then compare this growth (or lack thereof) with the party’s platforms and the findings shared in our literature. Having done that, we will look for possible overlaps in patterns or platforms that might support the causal link for which we’re looking, within the context of our ‘identity’ framework.

The British National Party

The BNP’s timeline of growth contains one fortunate correlation: As we discussed in the methodology, the party’s first major success after lagging during the 1980s was in the 1992 general election. This was the first election that took place after embattled Prime Minister John Major signed highly contentious Maastricht Treaty. If a person is looking for a correlation between a perceived EU threat and the modern arrival of the BNP, there it is.

However, upon further examination of our findings, we have to conclude that the causal link between the EU’s expanding power and the BNP’s is actually fairly weak. There is definitely a correlation — the BNP has continued to grow in a more or less steady rate since Maastricht — but we can see that other factors are at work.

The biggest factor that weakens a causal relationship is the presence of UKIP. According to Borisyuk et al., it is likely that anyone wishing to express opposition or distrust in Europe would have first considered the single-issue-based party, not necessarily the BNP. Though it is technically ‘right,’ UKIP for our working purposes does not qualify as ‘far-right’ in the same way that the BNP does. It does not have the quite the same negative connotations as the BNP, meaning that anti-EU voters may have felt freer to support it in the 2004 European elections.\textsuperscript{129} It’s difficult to see how

\textsuperscript{129} Borisyuk et al., 2007, p. 672
the BNP can be classified as a true anti-EU option when a purer anti-EU option is also available. In other words, people whose first priority was getting Britain to leave the EU would have supported UKIP, not the BNP.

The BNP fits in well with our running framework of ‘identity,’ however. The campaign literature paints a clear picture of a white, homogenous Britain, with low numbers of minority immigrants and the embrace of Judeo-Christian values. The BNP’s desire to align with Commonwealth states instead of the United States or Europe shows a heavy reliance on Britain’s culturally close relations.

Ford and Goodwin’s profile of the typical BNP voter shows someone who is likely engaged at the local level but probably not on a supranational level. We have seen that the average BNP voter is male, employed in manual labor and has a low education. Having read the BNP’s campaign literature and Ford and Goodwin’s psychographic data, we know that immigration is likely the motivating factor in BNP supporters, and the BNP promotes this thinking. However, Ford and Goodwin also found that the EU was a low priority for BNP voters, suggesting that immigration is important, but not necessarily EU-based immigration. This also supports the theory that true EU opponents will back UKIP and not the BNP.

**The National Front**

The National Front has had nearly four decades to either fade into obscurity or emerge as a major power player in French politics. Its pattern of growth and decline seems to be cyclical — its descents have eventually corrected in the form of electoral growth, while its electoral growth has always eventually died back down.

Evans positioned the National Front’s foreign policy initiatives as being largely driven by anti-Europe sentiment. However, the National Front has failed, in the long run, to show a set, one-way pattern of growth that would support our hypothesis. Its up-and-down behavior seems to suggest that some other forces are at work.

That should not be taken to mean that there is *no* causal relationship between the National Front and the EU. We have seen that France voted down the European Constitution in 2005, after the National Front campaigned hard against it, and Evans suggests that the party successfully used the specter of Turkey joining the EU to drum up opposition.
The pinnacle of the National Front’s authority, as we have said, was in 2002 when Jean-Marie Le Pen shocked the country (and the world) by over-performing in the presidential elections and knocking out Lionel Jospin. This electoral victory coincided with the introduction of the euro into circulation and a period when the EU’s influence was increasing.

The National Front spent the rest of the decade taking losses, however, losing seats in the European Parliament between 2004 and 2009 before recovering somewhat in the 2010 regional elections.

The National Front’s program places a massive emphasis on immigration, expressing distrust of Muslims and opposition to the EU’s Schengen agreement. While the party qualifies as nationalistic, its campaign literature is decidedly not as overtly patriotic as that of other parties that we’re discussing.

What can we infer from the National Front’s electoral results and its political manifests? At this point, we cannot say for sure that a causal link is weak or nonexistent. Unlike the BNP, the National Front does not seem to have an equivalent of UKIP, which would let French voters oppose the EU without having to side with an outright xenophobia party. It is difficult to draw much of a conclusion based on mostly cyclical evidence. Fysh and Wolfreys’ gave a description of a successful National Front in the 1980s, and we have no way of knowing for sure if the strong 2010 performance will be maintained in the next election.

It is possible that given France’s long-time membership in the EU and the European Economic Community before it, its people are more used to EU policies by now and thus likelier to support or oppose the EU in the cycles that we’ve seen.

**The Party for Freedom**

The Dutch far-right party of Geert Wilders is our first clear-cut example of a solid causal link between the party’s expansion and the influence of the European Union. We have electoral evidence as well as anecdotal evidence.

Anecdotally, we know from Aarts and van der Kolk that it was specifically EU expansion into Turkey — or rather, the threat of allowing Turkey to join the EU — that caused Wilders to quit the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy. This

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130 Fysh and Wolfreys, 1992, p. 309
means that not only was the party’s electoral fortune tied to the EU, but the party also owed its very existence to the EU.

Wilders’ very outward-looking persona helped the Party for Freedom gain nine seats in parliament only a year after founding it. In 2009, it finished second among the Dutch contenders in the European elections. That amount of success in so short a time can only reasonably be attributed to the anti-European message that Wilders was promoting. As Vossen notes, there was nothing extraordinary or notable about Wilders before he left his first party; the initial success here has to be due mainly to the message. The fact that the Dutch people soundly rejected the European Constitution in the same year that Wilders founded the party shows that there was a public appetite for that sort of political philosophy. That the party has continued to flourish should indicate that its message still resonates, and that message is primarily saying no to Europe.

The Party for Freedom, through its political campaign literature, definitely fits within our concept of ‘identity’ trumping liberalism. The party pits Judeo-Christian traditions squarely against Islamic ones and produces imagery of an ethnic Dutch couple with Dutch names propping up two stereotypically named Muslim immigrants. As we saw in Aarts and van der Kolk’s survey, maintaining Dutch identity — language, national sovereignty and culture — was a powerful motivator when people were deciding on how to vote in the constitutional referendum.

As we suggested previously, the Party for Freedom explicitly decries not just immigration but mainly EU-controlled immigration in its manifestos. Unlike BNP voters, who are fed visuals of third-world refugees washing up on Britain’s shores, the Dutch who read the Party for Freedom’s programs are explicitly warned against Turkish Muslims, an influx that will likely only occur should Turkey join the EU. In this way, the Party for Freedom’s program makes saving ethnic integrity and opposing the EU more or less one and the same.

Based on all of this, we can reasonably conclude that the Party for Freedom supports our hypothesis: Its influence is inexorably linked to that of the EU, and it relies specifically on fear of the EU for growth and support.
**Jobbik**

Jobbik’s inception, as we have seen, occurred after Hungary had voted to join the EU but before the inclusion became official.

Like the Party for Freedom, Jobbik’s success came within a relatively short period of time. While its performance in the 2006 national elections was limp, its third-place results in the 2010 national elections understandably caused a great deal of alarm, as did the party’s successful pickup of three seats in the European Parliament in 2009.

How much of this success, though, can be attributed to the EU and its policies?

We know, based on party literature and the writings of Antal, Sen and Kulinska that Jobbik is heavily against the EU and considers it an evil. But it is problematic to say for certain that the EU is responsible and not just, say, domestic racism and anti-Semitism.

We might have a solution, however, in Sen’s writing. To Sen’s way of thinking, the growth and success of a party like Jobbik within the borders of an EU member states should be taken as categorical evidence that the EU’s domestic-level philosophy has failed. Somewhere, along the line, the EU’s liberalism failed in Hungary. To determine where, we need only look at the 1997 referendum, when Hungarian voters voted to join the EU in a landslide.

Could it be that Jobbik is Hungary’s way of punishing the EU for what it considers broken economic and social promises? Hungarians can scapegoat the Roma on a domestic level, but the EU is still ‘to blame’ on a supranational level. Hungary and some of its neighbors joined the EU based on the possibility of a stable economy, employment and political inclusion. When Hungary did not achieve that, Jobbik’s success was the electoral result of citizens’ exasperation and desperation. Sen’s fear that far-right infiltration at the supranational level — in, say, the European Parliament — could eventually radically alter the EU if left unchecked seems especially relevant here.

Bluntly, if Hungary was getting what it wanted to or expected to out of the EU, its people would have no incentive to back a party that traffics in fear and frustration like Jobbik. Whereas the Dutch are backing Wilders’ party to prevent an EU-backed shift in cultural influence, many Hungarians are likely supporting Jobbik
to ‘punish’ the EU for what they perceive as its failure to give them a better economic situation. The Roma get their punishment in the streets, and the EU will continue to get its punishment at the polls.

Jobbik’s literature encourages this dissatisfaction, proclaiming the laundry list of ways that the EU has wronged ethnic Hungarians and given unfair preference (in their eyes) to Hungary’s neighbors. The party knows how to feed the beast.

**The Freedom Party of Austria**

It is difficult trace the Freedom Party’s correlation with the EU with certainty. As we discussed in the methodology, the party is 55 years old but only recently has it embraced a far-right, nationalist ideology. Its current philosophical underpinnings go back to 1986, the year Haider took control of it.

Since then, the Freedom Party has shown impressive electoral growth, even after Haider left the party to form another one. Heinz-Christian Strache took the reins in 2005 and has maintained the party’s growth rates. The Freedom Party is now Austria’s third-largest, after the two centre parties.

There is some debate as to whether the Freedom Party even qualifies as a far-right entity. Fillitz maintains that if it wasn’t for the group’s strong anti-immigration policies, it might qualify as a *liberal* party. Luther traces its anti-Europe positions back to 1994, when Austria voted to join the EU. Like Fillitz, he has doubts that the Freedom Party should qualify as a far-right party. Like Jobbik, the Freedom Party’s current manifestation coincides with EU entry, suggesting that a causal relationship is at work.

We might explain the Freedom Party’s continued support by seeing how it exploits fear and uncertainty about the EU’s eastward expansion. This is not just Turkish expansion, but also the expansion into former Soviet bloc states. Fillitz points out that Austria had a large eastern European immigration problem in the 1990s after the fall of communism; it’s possible that memories of this still influence Austrians’ voting habits. At the supranational level, the Freedom Party had a successful showing in the 2009 European elections, picking up two seats. As *Der Spiegel* reported, the current Freedom Party manifesto is tinged with anti-EU rhetoric, namely accusing the Austrian chancellor of being an EU agent and opposing the Greek bailout.
Like the other parties featured, the Freedom Party fits easily within our identity framework. Its campaign literature features, among basic policy briefs, strong assertions of German identity in terms of ethnicity, religion and language. Unlike Jobbik, which claims to have a domestic ‘problem’ with the Roma, Austria has no comparable domestic concern, and much of what the Freedom Party espouses has to do with outside political affairs, namely immigration. The defense of Austria’s Germanic heritage may be taken as a shield of sorts, a way for the party to defend Austria’s ethnic and cultural identity from perceived outsiders.

Based on this and the growing support of the Freedom Party (since Strache’s rise to power and also the 2004 entry of eastern bloc states), we should be able to reasonably infer a causal link between perceived the perceived authority of the EU and the electoral support of the Freedom Party.

What conclusions can we draw from our case studies?

1. Though a correlation is present, there is little to no causal evidence that the EU influences the electoral performance of the BNP, based on the presence of UKIP as an alternative and the lack of BNP voters’ interest in the EU. Immigration and identity play large roles in the BNP’s platforms, but not necessarily where the EU is involved.

2. There is some evidence of causation between the EU and the National Front, although the party’s cyclical electoral performance makes it difficult to determine a perceptible pattern.

3. There is evidence that the Party for Freedom, Jobbik and the Freedom Party all share a causal link with the EU in terms of their electoral performance. This is based on quantitative evidence — all three parties have maintained a positive growth trend as they’ve move along the x axis of time — as well as qualitative evidence — we know that Wilders founded the Party for Freedom as a direct result of dissatisfaction with the EU, and that the platforms of all three parties stress an anti-Europe position combined with opposition to immigration, especially Turkish immigration.
Based on these conclusions, we will attempt to find common traits to describe the conditions in which a far-right party may grow favorably in the same direction as EU expansion.

1. The three parties that showed evidence of causal links came from smaller states that do not have significant representation in the EU in terms of their populations. It is possible that smaller states are more susceptible to far-right influence in this sense, because the perceived threat of lingual and cultural extinction is greater.

2. The three parties that showed evidence of causal links, in addition to the National Front, all have well-known, recognizable names and faces associated with them and featured prominently in its campaign materials. The parties build camaraderie by making personal connections between their leaders and their voters.

3. The three parties that showed evidence of causal links, in addition to the National Front, are all at an increased risk of short-notice immigration from other member states, as well as Turkey if it were to ever join. Much of Britain’s immigration issues, according to the BNP, come from Africa and Asia. Because Britain is more isolated from other EU states than the other examples, it has less to fear from increased EU migration in the short run, mitigating the EU’s effects on it.

4. We should not underestimate the psychological power that issues of identity possess. The Dutch, Hungarian and Austrian parties are examples that demonstrate how tapping into voters’ fear of the different and the unknown can lead to electoral success. In fact, it is not a coincidence that these three nationalist parties promote their states’ ethnic and cultural backgrounds the most.

5. Backlash against the EU may theoretically come at any time and be associated with either a state’s entry or the entry of other states. In the case of Jobbik, the party’s expansion coincided with Hungary’s entry into the EU. In the cases of Austria and the Netherlands, it was the threat of other EU entrants (eastern Europe and Turkey, respectively) that incited action.
In summation, right-wing parties will be likeliest to benefit from EU backlash in elections (both on the national and supranational level): if they’re in smaller states; if they present a personable face to lead the party; if their states would be immediately or shortly affected by any changes in immigration law; if they make good use of identity-based political propaganda; and if they coincide their debuts or program announcements with major EU-related events such as referenda, the state’s entry into the EU or other states’ entry into the EU.

We have discovered that, with conditions, our hypothesis is largely supported. Based on the characteristics of the states’ parties that supported the hypothesis, we have presented a list of those conditions.

Our framework of identity has also emerged as a plausible explanation for much of the far right’s behavior. At their core, these nationalist parties are about preserving national identity in some way, shape or form and ‘saving’ it from the EU. In most of our cases, fear of losing a state’s identity overcame the EU’s principles of economic and social integration. The EU’s philosophical basis can easily be overcome by a party’s identity agenda.

From here, we may ask how to keep right-wing parties from gaining a foothold in EU member states. The solution appears to be for mainstream parties to put effort into preserving and honoring their states’ ethnic and cultural heritage, and working hard to placate small states’ fears that the EU will homogenize them. A prudent immigration policy, even across EU borders, should keep that issue from being exploited. Mainstream parties should also work harder to inform their citizens — truthfully — about any matters of EU voting, including votes in the European Parliament and the content of any referenda that come up. Much of the distrust of the EU stems from a distrust of state political parties in general; far-right parties have, in one way or another, convinced voters that they can be trusted to maintain a state’s identity. By taking control of the narrative, moderate parties can prevent far-right expansion.
V. Conclusion

This paper sought to answer the question of whether the European Union’s expanding influence could be causally linked to the behavior of far-right nationalist parties in its member states. We framed our question from the perspective of a normative liberal institution such as the EU facing the power of national identity. If identity had to confront liberal values, which one would yield?

We selected five far-right parties in five different states to use as case studies. For each one, we examined its recent electoral data, its political programs and academic background information. With this combined quantitative and qualitative evidence, we then sought to determine the existence of a causal link. In one of the five cases — the British National Party — we were unable to determine a causal link. In another of the five — the French National Front — we suspected a causation but were unable to determine a pattern. And in three of the five — the Dutch Party for Freedom, the Hungarian Jobbik and the Austrian Freedom Party — we were able to infer a causal relationship based on electoral patterns and background information.

We examined the three parties that showed a causal relationship and found a defining set of characteristics: a small, relatively non-influential state; a charismatic leader; the perceived threat of immigration; the use of strong identity-based imagery in campaign materials; and coinciding major program announcements or the party’s debut with major EU-based events.

Our findings corroborated our idea that ‘identity’ as an ideological framework could, given the proper context, withstand the application of normative liberal theory if the two ever came to odds. In short, who we are matters more than what we think. It is because the far right understands this idea already that it is able exploit people’s insecurities that are based on identity markers such as language, religion, ethnicity and nationality. If mainstream parties want to stop the far right from reaping a fertile electoral harvest, they need to successfully quell these fears instead of fanning them.

This type of research is important because, as we have seen in our literature, there is a prevailing opinion that said parties could undermine the democratic process in their states, or even carry their ideologies into the European Parliament itself. Many of these parties are growing into major domestic forces, and they are starting to gain some influence, however minor, in the European Parliament. In the case of Jobbik, it
has its own foot soldiers, and it is possible, maybe even likely, that if a violent conflict broke out, Jobbik use the Magyar Gárda to impose its will.

Defeating far-right parties within the EU must use a two-fold strategy. First, mainstream parties must negate the far right’s influence within their own national governments. This necessitates understanding the importance of identity politics and preventing the far right from owning that narrative. Second, these same parties must work to prevent far-right groups from making any more substantial gains in the European Parliament.

It is not out of the realm of possibility that Sen’s dire warning comes true: a European Parliament overrun with extremist elements that wish to destroy it from within. By behaving impotently in the face of far-right gains, mainstream parties are, in effect, inviting a Trojan horse to enter the European Parliament. It is easy to brush off this suggestion now based on the very low level of support these parties currently enjoy, but that could change in the next election. Strache of Austria’s Freedom Party is already looking to exploit discontent over the euro bailouts, and he’s far from alone.

It would be interesting, perhaps in a longer project, to look at far-right groups in every EU member state and see if the same conditional causal relationships are present. Would our conditions still work? Would some larger states show a strong causal relationship, or would some smaller states show a weaker causal relationship, or none at all? Another interesting project would be to feed extensive pieces of party literature through a word aggregator and measure electoral results against the number of times certain words come up. Do some words guarantee or negate success?

We can sum up our findings here by once again reaffirming the imperative nature of identity ownership. Voters across the EU, faced with a burgeoning supranational behemoth, are demonstrably anxious about retaining their own national and cultural identities. They will, when pressed, flock to the parties that assuage their fears — and if those parties tend to be illiberal and anti-democratic, so be it.
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**Political Parties**


**Electoral and Demographic Data**

